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Abstract
Academic libraries rely on fair use for key functions in support of edu-
cation. Among these functions are provision of electronic reserves, 
mass digitization, provision of access for print-disabled students, and 
preservation. These were the practices at issue in the 2008 Georgia 
State University e-reserves case and the 2012 HathiTrust case. This 
article explores the two lawsuits where libraries were sued for alleged 
copyright infringement. We explore how the courts in each case 
applied fair use to the facts of the case, compare and contrast the 
courts’ analysis, and explain the role that transformative use plays 
in distinguishing the outcomes. Finally, the article applies lessons 
learned from the two cases to common library activities.
Introduction
The story of fair use as a legal doctrine is part of the story of the United 
States as a new nation. In 1839, Jared Sparks published a twelve-volume 
biography of George Washington including Washington’s letters and cor-
respondences, not previously published. There was a presumption of sig-
nificant public interest in a first published work on the life of the relatively 
new nation’s first president. Sparks’s copyright interest in Washington’s 
biography had eight more years of protection under the 1790 Copyright 
Act. But in October 1841, Sparks’s printer and publisher, Charles Folsom, 
sued Massachusetts bookseller Bela Marsh for copyright infringement for 
publishing a two-volume biography of George Washington that took pages 
of Washington’s letters and correspondences from the Sparks book. Al-
though Marsh was found to be infringing, in considering the case, Judge 
Story formulated the basis of fair use: “The question of piracy, often de-
pends upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of the 
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materials of the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials thus 
used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be 
fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of informa-
tion, or to have exercised the same common diligence in the selection and 
arrangement of the materials. Thus, for example, no one can doubt that 
a reviewer may fairly cite largely from the original work, if his design be 
really and truly to use the passages for the purposes of fair and reasonable 
criticism (Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (1841)). 
U.S. courts have been deciding fair use cases for close to two hundred 
years of American legal history. Between 1841 and 1976, U.S. courts de-
cided whether specific uses of works under copyright protection were fair, 
relying on Story’s fair use statement. Congress finally codified fair use as 
Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act. The scope of uses implicating the 
fair use doctrine over the centuries is broad and varied. In 1984, the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered whether time-shifting or recording a television 
show for later viewing was fair use (Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). In 1994, it considered whether a rap song by 
2 Live Crew sufficiently transformed Roy Orbison’s 1964 song “Oh, Pretty 
Woman” into a new work to be fair use (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569 (1994)). And in 2007, a 9th Circuit California court consid-
ered whether Google’s transmission of Perfect 10’s images of nude models 
constituted fair use (Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 487 F.3d 701 (2007)). 
The courts in each of these instances concluded fair use prevailed.
Since 1841, there are only two substantial legal cases involving libraries 
as parties named in major litigation making it to U.S. courts’ dockets. This 
paper explores the contours of the fair use defenses in Cambridge Univ. 
Press v. Becker, popularly known as the Georgia State University eReserves 
case (GSU), and Authors Guild v. HathiTrust (HDL). 
 Electronic reserves and mass digitization are two of many functions 
that academic libraries perform as a matter of course in serving their edu-
cational missions. The fact that these activities end up in the court system 
is noteworthy on several fronts. It indicates that libraries employ the kinds 
of technologies that require courts to define the scope of what is legal 
under the Copyright Act of 1976, passed well before current technologies 
existed. Additionally, it challenges librarians to become savvier in their 
knowledge of copyright, and other bodies of law, including contract, that 
inform how we do our work.
By providing a foundational overview of copyright law and fair use, this 
paper aims to inform librarians of and contextualize core activities such 
as electronic reserves and mass digitization, within the American legal tra-
dition. To what end? Numerous library activities implicate fair use, not 
just as a defense to a potential copyright infringement suit, but as a right 
articulated in the Copyright Act itself. By comparing and contrasting how 
the courts analyze the four factors in the two cases, we can gain a fuller 
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understanding of how courts decide what constitutes fair use, and are thus 
better able to anticipate how courts may respond to potential copyright 
infringement litigation.
Putting Fair Use in Context
Copyright ownership confers the legal right to exclude others from “re-
producing, distributing, creating derivative works, displaying the work 
publicly, performing the work publicly, or performing the work by digital 
audio transmission” (17 U.S.C. § 106) without permission or license from 
the owner. But suppose a teacher needs to show portions of or an entire 
film in the classroom or upload it to a secure online platform for students 
to view it for an assignment (17 U.S.C. § 110). A print-disabled student 
might need a whole book digitized for a course (17 U.S.C. § 121). At the 
end of a semester, a student plans to resell used textbooks to a bookstore 
(17 U.S.C. § 109). Libraries buy books so they can lend them and often 
send journal articles to other libraries (17 U.S.C. 108). These scenarios 
implicate exclusive rights of copyright owners. In each of these instances, 
would the user then have to ask permission of the copyright owner each 
time he or she needs to perform everyday activities that are essential to 
scholarship and teaching? What if the owner refuses permission, would 
that foreclose the public from using copyrighted works?
Approved in 1787, the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution aimed 
to balance the rights of authors and inventors with public needs to use 
protected works. “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to Authors and 
Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies” (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8). Sections 107–122 of the Copyright Act 
set exceptions to owner’s exclusive rights that allow public use of copy-
righted works without requiring the owner’s permission to do so.
The 1976 Copyright Act laid out the fair use exception to the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders in section 107 of the act:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use 
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (includ-
ing multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not 
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of 
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include—
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.
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The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use 
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. (17 
U.S.C. § 107)
Added to the legislative record of the 1976 Copyright Act, the Agree-
ment on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals was not part of the Act 
itself.1 Partisan groups developed the guidelines (Cambridge Univ. Press v. 
Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1235 f.12 (11th Cir. Ga. Oct. 17, 2014)), which not 
only blatantly diverge from the four factors in the fair use statute and 
replace them with three different mandates but also add blanket prohi-
bitions that cannot be overcome by any balancing of factors or equities 
(Crews 2001, 618). However, in litigation, publishers cite the Classroom 
Copying Guidelines as if the Guidelines have legal authority (Crews 2001, 
639–56). Accordingly, the guidelines are not law.
The Copy Shop Cases as Precedent for GSU  
and Hathitrust 
While lawsuits against academic libraries for copyright infringement was 
novel before the GSU and HathiTrust cases, there is precedent for courts 
to consider. The GSU case follows a line of cases tracing back to Williams 
& Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. November 27, 1973) 
where the National Institute of Health’s photocopying of articles for re-
searchers was found to be fair use. The copy shop and Texaco cases fol-
lowed. Most analogous to the GSU case were the copy shop cases, Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 
1991), and Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th 
Cir. Mich. Nov. 8, 1996).
In each case, the issue was whether a copy shop creating coursepacks 
from copyrighted material, without paying license fees, was infringing on 
copyrights held by the publishers. In both cases, the commercial nature of 
the use weighed against fair use. The courts focused on the purpose of the 
copy shop in selling the coursepacks, not the educational purpose of the 
professors or students. The court in Princeton explicitly declined to con-
sider whether it would be fair use for students or professors to make their 
own copies (Princeton, F. 3d 1389). Both courts also deem the purpose of 
the use nontransformative, so weighing against fair use.
Addressing the Defendant’s argument that academic authors do not 
need economic incentive to publish, the Princeton court concluded that it 
is publishers who own the copyrights and obviously need economic incen-
tives to publish scholarly works, even if the scholars do not need direct eco-
nomic incentives to write such works (Princeton, F. 3d 1390). The Princeton 
court further rejected Defendant’s argument that only book sales should 
be considered. It reasoned that when a copyright holder has an interest in 
exploiting the licensing market, especially when they have already done 
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so, potential licensing revenues should be considered in a fair use analysis 
(id.). Both courts found the fourth factor weighs against fair use.
Decided between the two copy shop cases, the issue in Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. N.Y. Oct. 28, 1994) was whether 
Texaco infringed the publisher’s copyrights when it allowed researchers to 
make copies of journal articles. Physical copies of journals were circulated 
to the researchers, who made copies of articles for later use (Texaco, 60 F. 
3d 926). The court did not consider the research purpose of the scientists 
as opposed to the sales purpose in Kinko’s, finding that the purpose of the 
copies was to avoid paying for additional copies, and the researcher’s use 
of the articles was ultimately to the benefit of Texaco, and therefore com-
mercial (Texaco, 60 F. 3d 922).
In considering the fourth factor, the court noted there was an exist-
ing workable market for institutional users to obtain licenses through the 
Copyright Clearance Center (Texaco, 60 F. 3d 930). Rejecting the notion 
that a license market destroys the possibility of fair use, the court found 
this danger only arises if the availability of payment is conclusive against 
fair use (Texaco, 60 F. 3d 931). The court nonetheless found that the fourth 
factor also weighed in favor of the Plaintiffs, and ultimately found Texaco 
liable for copyright infringement.
These three cases raise issues that will be prominent in the Georgia 
State case, including the status and authority of the Classroom Copying 
Guidelines. In each case, the court found the purpose of the use non-
transformative and commercial, so weighing against fair use, and did not 
address library or noncommercial copying. The courts also examined the 
place of licensing revenue in the fourth factor consideration of market 
impact.
In contrast, the HathiTrust case followed a line of transformative use 
cases where the nature of the use is different from the creator’s intended 
use. The U.S. Supreme Court case Campbell v. Acuff Rose first defined trans-
formative fair use, asking whether a use supersedes the original use, “or 
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in 
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transforma-
tive’” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). The 
legal question in the HathiTrust case turned on the first factor analysis of 
whether HDL’s full-text search engine was transformative and thus a fair 
use.
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker (GSU Case)
In April 2008, Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press, and 
Sage Publications, Inc. sued Georgia State University for copyright in-
fringement for making works available on its electronic reserve system 
without paying permissions or licensing fees. Among other defenses, GSU, 
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a unit of the University System of Georgia (USG), claimed the affirmative 
defense of fair use. In 2009, USG implemented a new fair use policy and 
checklist. This checklist provided instructors with a method of determin-
ing whether their use of a particular work in electronic reserves or a course 
management system was a fair use. It was similar to checklists used by many 
universities, in particular that created at Columbia University. (Columbia 
University Libraries 2008). Following many competing motions, the court 
determined that the trial would proceed based on works published by the 
three Defendants and used during the spring, summer, and fall semesters 
of 2009, the semesters immediately following the implementation of the 
new checklist.
A nonjury bench trial was held in 2011, and in 2012 the North Georgia 
District Court issued the first opinion. The court found five instances of 
infringement among seventy-six alleged instances and declared GSU the 
prevailing party. The Publishers appealed, and in 2014 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals overturned the District Court decision and sent the 
case back to the District Court to reconsider. A minority opinion strongly 
disagreed with the majority’s fair use analysis.2 The District Court issued 
a new ruling in 2016, finding only four instances of infringement. The 
publishers again appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. As of this writing, a new 
ruling from the Eleventh Circuit is pending. 
In this paper, the GSU cases are referenced as follows.3 The first District 
Court case, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (2012), 
will be Cambridge 2012. The Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court decision, Cam-
bridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (2014), will be Cambridge 2014, 
and the second District Court decision, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 118793 (2016), will be Cambridge 2016. Since much of the 
2012 decision was affirmed by the 2014 decision, sections of both opinions 
are cited.
Authors Guild v. HathiTrust
In 2004, a group of research universities permitted Google to digitize 
books in their collections, known as the Google Books Project. In 2008, 
led by the University of Michigan Libraries, thirteen research libraries 
announced their launch of the HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL), a col-
lection of over ten million digitized works, including works digitized by 
Google, from eighty member libraries. The scope of the digital collection 
is vast. It comprises books from different languages, published in differ-
ent time periods, and in different genres and topics. In the HathiTrust 
Digital Library (HDL) project, the digitization of in-copyright books in-
volves three distinct uses. First, HDL allows users from the general public 
to search for terms within a specified work, and the output displays the 
page numbers where the word is found within the work and the number of 
times the word is on each page. The search results do not include any text 
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from the works searched. Second, HDL allows users with certified print 
disabilities to access the full-text of digitized works. Print disability is evalu-
ated and certified by qualified experts and includes conditions such as a 
visual impairment, learning disability, physical disability, or other disability 
that impedes a person’s ability to access print in the standard way. Third, 
HDL digitized in-copyright books for preservation purposes. A member 
university library or archive, or one open to the public can make a replace-
ment copy of a book if the library already owns a copy, and the library’s 
copy is lost, destroyed, or stolen, and the replacement copy is not available 
at a fair market price. HDL stores copies of the in-copyright books at four 
different campuses as backup.
The University of Michigan also worked on a digitization plan for or-
phan works under the Orphan Works Project (OWP). Orphan works are 
out-of-print books that are still under copyright protection whose copy-
right holder is not known or readily found to ask permission to make 
certain uses of the work. The University of Michigan, however, suspended 
the OWP roll out due to concern that it’s filtering between orphan works 
and in-copyright books may not be adequately stringent to rule out in-
copyright books from the digitization process.
In 2012, the Authors Guild brought suit against university officials as-
sociated with the HDL, alleging the Defendants infringed the copyright 
of the Plaintiffs’ works by digitizing, distributing, and storing books in the 
Defendants’ collections without obtaining permission or having a license 
from the copyright owners to do so. On behalf of individuals who have 
print disabilities, the National Federation for the Blind intervened in the 
lawsuit. HDL moved for summary judgment, asking the court not to send 
the case to a jury trial because there was no dispute over the facts. The 
court granted summary judgment to HDL, and subsequently, Plaintiffs 
appealed the decision.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals for the Southern District of New 
York considered the decisions of the District Court. The Second Circuit 
affirmed the District Court’s holding that it was fair use for HDL to digitize 
in-copyright works for full-text searching, allowing access to digitized full-
text content to certified print-disabled users. 
In this paper, the HathiTrust cases are referenced as follows. The Dis-
trict Court Decision, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(2012), will be Authors Guild 2012. The Second Circuit Appellate Court 
decision, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2014), will be Au-
thors Guild 2014.
Analysis of the Four Fair Use Factors
Both the Georgia State and HathiTrust lawsuits involve academic librar-
ies. They both revolve around digitization of print books. The GSU case is 
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about mirror-image copying, while HathiTrust is a transformative use. This 
section explores how the courts do or do not vary in their application of 
the four fair use factors.
In the GSU case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated the in-
tended purpose of copyright, “which is to promote the creation of new 
works for the public good by providing authors and other creators with an 
economic incentive to create” (Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). Further, “some unpaid use of copyrighted materi-
als must be allowed in order to prevent copyright from functioning as a 
straightjacket that stifles to the very creative activity it seeks to foster,” and 
that fair use helps a court find the appropriate balance (Cambridge 2014, 
at 1238).
Factor 1—The Purpose and Character of the Use, Including Whether Such Use Is 
of a Commercial Nature or Is for Nonprofit Educational Purposes
In analyzing the first factor, the courts ask whether the use “transforms” 
the material taken from the copyrighted work by using it for a broadly 
beneficial purpose different from that of the original, or if the use of the 
work is for the same intent and value as the original. Transformative uses 
are considered to be more fair. In contrast, “mirror-image” copying where 
the use of the material is the same as the author’s intent is considered 
less fair. Also considered under the first factor is whether the use is for 
a commercial or nonprofit purpose and whether the use is educational. 
These factors derive from the preface to the fair use statute, which calls 
out examples of the types of purposes that may be fair use, “such as criti-
cism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research” (17 U.S.C. § 107).
In considering the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the 
GSU courts diverged from the findings of the copy shop and Texaco courts. 
While those courts put great weight on the commercial nature of the use, 
the GSU courts put equal emphasis on the nonprofit educational use. 
“Because Georgia State is a purely nonprofit, educational institution and 
the excerpts at issue were used for purely nonprofit, educational purposes, 
this case is distinguishable from Kinko’s, Michigan Document Services, and 
Texaco” (Cambridge 2012, at 1224). The court also found that even though 
transformative uses are more likely to be fair uses, that was not a bar to 
finding that factor one favored fair use, noting that the Supreme Court 
stated that “the obvious statutory exception to this focus on transformative 
uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribu-
tion” (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 579 at n.11 (1994)). 
The court found that since the uses are included in the preamble to factor 
one and GSU is a nonprofit educational institution, factor one favored fair 
use for all excerpts (Cambridge 2014, 1267). The minority opinion argued 
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that the analysis should focus primarily on the use, not on the user, and 
found GSU’s use the same as the use in the Coursepack Cases and that 
rather than the focus being on the distinction between commercial and 
nonprofit (or educational and noneducational), the focus should only be 
on the distinction between transformative use and nontransformative use 
that supersedes the original work (Cambridge 2014, 1289).
Analyzing the first factor, the HathiTrust court looked at each of three 
uses—full-text searching, preservation, and access for the print-disabled. 
The court found the full-text search transformative, since there was no 
evidence the authors write to enable full-text searches of their books. Con-
sequently, the full-text search function does not supersede the objects or 
purposes of the original creation (Authors Guild 2014, at 97, citing Camp-
bell, 510 U.S. at 579). Consequently, the full-text search function does not 
supersede the objects or purposes of the original creation (id). The Dis-
trict Court found that access for the print-disabled was not transformative 
but, citing the legislative history of the Copyright Act, found that it was 
a favored use under the first factor. “The House Committee Report that 
accompanied codification of the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 
1976 expressly stated that making copies accessible ‘for the use of blind 
persons’ posed a ‘special instance illustrating the application of the fair 
use doctrine . . .’ (H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 73 (1976)” (Authors Guild 
2014, at 102). Finally, although not affirmed by the Circuit Court, the Dis-
trict Court also found preservation to weigh in favor of fair use under the 
first factor, due to its noncommercial purpose (Authors Guild 2012, 459).
Factor 2—The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
Under the second factor, courts determine whether the work being used 
is creative or fact-based. The District Court in the GSU case found that 
since the books were all factual in nature, the second factor always favored 
fair use. The Eleventh Circuit appellate court found the all-encompassing 
approach to be erroneous, holding that where the excerpts contained 
“evaluative, analytical, or subjectively descriptive material that surpasses 
the bare facts necessary to communicate information, or derives from the 
Authors experiences or opinions” (Cambridge 2014, at 1270), the District 
Court should have found the second factor neutral or weighing against 
fair use. But the court added that the second factor is of relatively little 
importance in this case (id.). On remand, the District Court considered 
whether the excerpts go beyond mere facts, and found a mix of outcomes 
with the second factor neutral or weighing against fair use, but the factor 
does not impact the overall analysis of each excerpt. The HathiTrust court 
did not give much weight to the second factor, noting that “this factor may 
be of limited use where, as here, the creative work is being used for a trans-
formative purpose” (Authors Guild 2014, at 98, citing Bill Graham Archives 
v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2006)).
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Factor 3—The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used In Relation to the 
Copyrighted Work 
The GSU District Court first said that determining the permissible amount 
requires looking at factors one and four, observed the danger that mirror-
image copies can lead to market substitution, and noted that the threat 
is reduced when the amount used is small. The court rejected any role 
for the Classroom Copying Guidelines in determining the appropriate 
amount for fair use and went on to note that while the works at issue 
are similar to those in the copy shop cases, the nonprofit educational use 
allows for a greater amount than the commercial uses (Cambridge 2012, 
1232). The District Court created a metric whereby as long as the excerpt 
fills a legitimate educational purpose and is narrowly tailored to accom-
plish that purpose, if a book is not divided into chapters or is fewer than 
ten chapters, copying of no more than 10 percent weighs in favor of fair 
use, and when a book has ten or more chapters, copying of one chapter 
weighs in favor. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Dis-
trict Court’s ten percent/one-chapter rule was improper, and approved 
of the District Court’s consideration of whether individual instances were 
excessive in relation to the pedagogical purpose (Cambridge 2014, 1275). 
The minority opinion argued that the Classroom Guidelines should be 
given weight since they “provide, inter alia, strict word count limits on 
allowable copying, such as the lesser of an excerpt from a prose work of 
not more than 1,000 words or 10 percent of the work” (Cambridge 2014, 
at 1290). This is a surprising argument since the Classroom Guidelines 
themselves begin as follows: “The purpose of the following guidelines is 
to state the minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use 
under Section 107” (Classroom Guidelines; emphasis added).
The HathiTrust court agreed that there is no bright-line rule as to how 
much can be copied (Authors Guild 2014, 98) and still remain a fair use, 
and that “for some purposes it may be necessary to copy the whole work, in 
which case Factor Three does not weigh against a finding of fair use” (id.). 
Considering the HDL purposes, the court found that it was reasonably 
necessary to copy the entire works, so the copying was not excessive (id.). 
Factor 4—The Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market for or Value of the 
Copyrighted Work 
The GSU court reasoned that the adverse market effect to consider is that 
of market substitution, always a threat of mirror-image copying, and con-
cluded that decidedly small excerpts do not substitute for the book as a 
whole so do not threaten the actual or potential sales of books, even if the 
practice is widespread (Cambridge 2012, 1236). The court proceeded to 
focus not on the book market but on the market for licensed excerpts, stat-
ing that “a book’s ability to command permission fees has a relationship to 
the value of the copyrighted, book, i.e., to the value of the copyright” (id., 
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at 1237). Citing Texaco, the court stated, “Where excerpts are reasonably 
available, at a reasonable price, it is only fair for this fact to be considered 
in determining whether Defendants’ unpaid uses of excerpts constitutes a 
fair use” (id.). The court found that where no license was available, the use 
caused no actual or potential damage to the value of the copyrights (id., 
1238), but the fourth factor weighs heavily against fair use when a license 
is readily available. The Eleventh Circuit supported this finding, noting 
that a copyright holder can always find an impact on potential licensing 
revenues, but “the goal of copyright is to stimulate the creation of new 
works, not to furnish copyright holders with control over all markets. Ac-
cordingly, the ability to license does not demand a finding against fair use” 
(Cambridge 2014, at 1276). However, a use can be “more fair” when there 
is not a license and “less fair” when a license or means of payment exists. 
The minority opinion argued that the majority was in error in considering 
the availability of the license since “establishing market harm does not 
require a showing of lost profits, nor is it dependent on the availability of a 
digital license. Rather, what counts is whether some meaningful likelihood 
of future harm exists” (Cambridge 2014, at 1291, quoting Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
The HathiTrust court initially noted that “factor four analysis is con-
cerned with only one type of economic injury to a copyright holder: the 
harm that results because the secondary use serves as a substitute for the 
original work” (Authors Guild 2014, at 99). The court dismissed the Plain-
tiff’s argument that every digitized book represents a lost sale, noting that 
purchase of an additional copy would not allow for full-text searching or 
access for the print-disabled (Authors Guild 2012, 462), and found Plain-
tiff’s argument about the potential for widespread piracy unsupported. 
The court found that the fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use for full-
text searching, since “a use that falls within a transformative market does 
not cause the copyright holder to suffer market harm due to the loss of 
license fees” (id., at 463), and weighs in favor for access to the print-dis-
abled since this access does not significantly impact a market (id., 464). 
The court further noted that development of a license market for full-text 
searching or development of a market for print-disabled access is specula-
tive at best and the harm identified minimal (id., 464 fn. 30). 
Balancing the factors in the GSU case, the Eleventh Circuit began by 
approving of the case-by-case analysis done by the District Court, stating 
that otherwise “courts would have no principled method of determining 
whether a nebulous cloud of alleged infringements purportedly caused by 
a secondary user should be excused by the defense of fair use” (Cambridge 
2014, at 1258 fn. 20). It further stated that the factors are not to be treated 
in isolation but weighed together in light of the purposes of copyright 
(See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569).
In balancing the factors, the HathiTrust District Court held that “the 
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enhanced search capabilities that reveal no in-copyright material, the pro-
tection of Defendants’ fragile books, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
unprecedented ability of print-disabled individuals to have an equal op-
portunity to compete with their sighted peers in the ways imagined by the 
ADA protect the copies made by Defendants as fair use” (Authors Guild 
2012, at 464).
Discussion
HathiTrust moved for summary judgment, arguing that the libraries’ uses 
of the works are protected fair uses. The court granted this motion (while 
denying a contrary motion from the Authors Guild), finding that the full-
text and print-disabled uses were fair uses as a matter of law, so the case 
did not go to trial, and there was no work-by-work analysis. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment. In contrast, the 
GSU case did not stop at the summary judgment stage and proceeded to 
trial. Therefore, there is a much more in-depth fair use analysis for the 
works at issue in the GSU case.
Under the first factor, the N.D. Ga. District Court and the S.D.N.Y Dis-
trict Court both considered the nature and purpose of the use. This is a 
two-part factor. The nature of the use in the cases is similar—digitization 
of print copies of copyrighted works. The difference is the purpose of 
the use, which is where the question of whether the use was mirror-image 
copying or transformative is relevant. 
In the GSU case, the court found the purpose to be the same purpose 
for which the book was published—for reading in a university setting. In 
contrast, the court in HathiTrust found that creating a full-text search 
capability was different from the purpose for which the works were pub-
lished. The full-text search does not expose a text for reading, which is the 
original purpose. The court also found that access for the print-disabled 
was different from the original—since the works were not available in an 
accessible format, the court found that original purpose was for reading 
by sighted persons (Authors Guild 2012, 461). 
Since the purposes in the HathiTrust case are transformative, the first 
factor weighed in favor, and the impact of the fourth factor, the market 
effect, is attenuated since it is not competing with the intended market.4 
The mirror-image copying in the GSU case weighs in favor under this fac-
tor because it is noncommercial, educational use, even though it is not 
transformative. Therefore the fourth factor has more weight since there is 
a threat of market substitution. When courts find a use transformative un-
der the first factor, the alleged infringement is far more likely to be found 
fair use than when a use is not transformative. A 2011 study of fair use case 
history concluded that “if the use is transformative and the Defendant has 
not copied excessively in light of the transformative purpose, the use will 
most likely be held to be a fair use. This is so even if the copyright holder 
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might enter or already has entered a licensing market for similar uses, and 
indeed even if the copyright holder would have been willing in principle 
to license the use in question” (Netanel 2011, 768).
Both courts concluded that the second factor, the nature of the copy-
righted work, has little weight in the analysis, but reach that conclusion 
via different paths. The HathiTrust court followed the precedent of other 
transformative use cases, finding that “where a use is transformative, the 
nature of the copyrighted works is not likely to ‘separate the fair use sheep 
from the infringing goats’” (Authors Guild 2012, at 461, citing Campbell, 510 
U.S. at 586). The court concluded that because the use is transformative, 
the second factor is not very relevant to their analysis (id.). The GSU court 
stated, “The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual 
works than works of fiction or fantasy, and so it is more likely that the use of 
a factual or informational work will be fair use” (Cambridge 2014, at 1268, 
citing Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985)), 
but then went on to examine other precedent where the work was both 
factual and creative, ultimately finding that the District Court was in error 
when it held that since none of the works are fictional, the second factor 
always favored fair use. The Eleventh Circuit calls for a more nuanced 
analysis, stating that “where the excerpts of Plaintiffs’ works contained 
evaluative, analytical, or subjectively described material that surpasses the 
bare facts necessary to communicate information, or derives from the Au-
thors own experiences or opinions” (Cambridge 2014, at 1270), the second 
factor is neutral or against where such material dominated the work. How-
ever, the court concluded, “That being said, the second fair use factor is 
of relatively little importance in this case” (id.) since the works are neither 
fictional nor unpublished. For the second factor, the outcome of the two 
cases is similar even though transformative use means the paths are dif-
ferent.
The third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, demonstrates the importance 
of the first factor in third factor analysis. The HathiTrust court began its 
discussion with the statement, “The third fair-use factor considers whether 
the amount of copying was reasonable in relation to the purpose” (Authors 
Guild 2012, at 461, citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417 (1984), at 449–50). The court readily concluded that entire 
copies of the works were necessary for both full-text searching and access 
for the print-disabled (Authors Guild 2012, 461). By finding the purpose 
under factor one transformative, the factor-three analysis became straight-
forward. In GSU, the nonprofit, educational use resulted in factor one 
always weighing in favor. However, the purpose does not as easily define 
the fair amount used in the mirror-image copying context, since the court 
must consider the effect on the market under the fourth factor. Still, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the proper approach was to ask whether the 
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amount used is excessive in light of the pedagogical purpose (Cambridge 
2014, 1275).
The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work is the fourth factor and is the factor where the divide 
between transformative and nontransformative fair use cases is most evi-
dent. In HathiTrust, the transformative nature and purpose of the use 
meant there was no market impact. “Courts consider only those markets 
that the creators of original works would in general develop or license oth-
ers to develop” (Authors Guild 2012, at 462, quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
591, 592.) The Plaintiffs in HathiTrust argued harm to a potential licensing 
market that would allow for the HathiTrust activities. The court rejected 
this argument since it is always possible to argue a potential market, stat-
ing, “Courts should consider only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be 
developed markets” (Authors Guild 2012, at 463, quoting Texaco, 60 F.3d at 
614), and concluded that “a use that falls within a transformative market 
does not cause the copyright holder to suffer market harm due to the loss 
of market fees” (Authors Guild 2012, at 463, citing Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 
615).
The courts consideration in the GSU case started with a different ap-
proach, stating that the court must consider “(1) the extent of the market 
harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, and (2) 
whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by 
the Defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the po-
tential market”(Cambridge 2014, at 1276, citing Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. 
World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1315 (2008)), going on to 
state that since the use is nontransformative and the works are published 
for educational purposes, the threat of market substitution is large. The 
court recognized the danger of allowing a market impact always to mili-
tate against a finding of fair use but states that as long as the availability 
of license doesn’t demand a finding against fair use, the market impact 
should carry significant weight. While in HathiTrust the court refused to 
consider a potential licensing market, in GSU the actual licensing market 
is determinative for the fourth factor analysis. Where a license is available, 
the use is “less fair” than when there is not a license available (Cambridge 
2014, at 1276). Transformative uses are not contemplated by the original 
use, whereas nontransformative uses are by definition using the work in 
the way it was originally contemplated, so a license market is likely to be a 
“traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed market” (citing Texaco, 
60 F3d at 614).
The courts evaluated each fair use factor in a similar way. The finding of 
transformative or mirror-image under the first factor drove the rest of the 
analysis. Each court considered precedent from cases with transformative 
or mirror-image findings under the first factor. The transformative use 
found in HDL led the court to grant summary judgment. The rest of the 
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factors are far less important once the court labels the use transformative. 
The nontransformative use holding in GSU meant that every use had to be 
analyzed with all four factors, even though factor one was always weighing 
in favor. The pedagogical purpose, the amount used, and the effect on the 
market must all be considered to determine if a use is fair.
Lessons for Fair Use in Library Services
In 2012, based on dozens of interviews with academic librarians and a 
series of small group discussions held with library policymakers around 
the country, a research team developed a consensus approach to apply-
ing fair use, and the Association of Research Libraries (ARL) released 
the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Libraries (ARL 
2012) (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The Code discusses seven li-
brary activities that rely on fair use: supporting teaching and learning with 
access to library materials via digital technologies; using selections from 
collection materials to publicize a library’s activities, or to create physical 
and virtual exhibitions; digitizing to preserve at-risk items; creating digi-
tal collections of archival and special collections materials; reproducing 
material for use by disabled students, faculty, staff, and other appropriate 
users; maintaining the integrity of works deposited in institutional reposi-
tories; and creating databases to facilitate nonconsumptive research uses 
(including search). Four of the activities are explicitly found to be fair use 
in the two cases.
Supporting teaching and learning with access to library materials via 
digital technologies describes the sharing of materials in e-reserves and 
course management systems, the practice at issue in the GSU case. While 
the Code argues that many of these uses can be transformative, it also rec-
ognizes what was key to fair use findings in GSU—“materials should be 
made available only when, and only to the extent that, there is a clear, 
articulable nexus between the instructor’s pedagogical purpose and the 
kind and amount of content involved” (Code 14). While the GSU court 
did not find any of the uses to be transformative, the Eleventh Circuit 
court did not rule out a use ever being transformative, stating that “we 
need not rule on whether such uses could ever be transformative, because 
the question is not before us” (Cambridge 2014, at 1263 fn. 21; see also But-
ler 2015). When relying on fair use for e-reserves, libraries should ensure 
that the use is either clearly transformative or is only of an amount that 
is carefully tailored to the pedagogical need and considers the impact on 
the market. 
Digitizing to preserve at-risk items is one of the three activities the court 
considers in HathiTrust. While section 108 of the copyright act provides 
some ability to libraries to digitize works, the current language requires the 
works be “damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen, or if the existing format 
in which the work is stored has become obsolete” (17 U.S.C. § 108(c)), 
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limiting the ability to save works. The S.D.N.Y. HathiTrust court found 
that while preservation on its own was not transformative, the preservation 
purposes of the HDL are noncommercial in nature (Authors Guild 2012, 
458 fn. 19). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did not affirm this as fair 
use but sent it back to the lower court for Plaintiffs to show actual damage. 
As the Plaintiffs did not pursue the case after the Second Circuit decision, 
the question of relying on fair use for digitizing to preserve at-risk items is 
still undecided in the courts.
Reproducing material for use by disabled students, faculty, staff, and 
other appropriate users is a use identified in the Code that was strongly af-
firmed in HathiTrust, where the court concluded that providing access to 
the print-disabled is a valid purpose under the first factor even though it 
is not transformative (Authors Guild 2014, 102). The court recognized that 
the activity is also covered under section 121 of the Copyright Act (The 
Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. §121), but, after doing a full fair use analy-
sis, determined it is also fair use. Libraries should feel confident providing 
access to in-copyright works to print-disabled patrons.
Finally, creating databases to facilitate nonconsumptive research uses 
(including search) was analyzed in HathiTrust. The court found this activ-
ity to be transformative, noting that “the result of a word search is differ-
ent in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message from the 
page (and the book) from which it is drawn” (Authors Guild 2014, at 97). 
Libraries engaging in activities to create databases of copyrighted works 
for nonconsumptive purposes should be confident.
Conclusion
Copyright law aims to provide economic incentive to creators and to en-
courage the development of culture. To that end, the law sets limits on 
exclusive rights of copyright owners to allow uses that advance societal 
needs and spread knowledge. Fair use is among the most powerful legal 
doctrines within the set of exceptions to owner rights that allows educa-
tors and other members of society to reap the benefits of creative works. 
Fair use consists of four factors that courts weigh together to determine 
whether a disputed use is fair and thus noninfringing on an owner’s rights. 
Part of the power of fair use is that no single factor solely determines the 
outcome and it does not contain bright-line rules. The hallmark flexibility 
of the fair use statute allows courts to exercise complex interpretive analy-
sis according to each set of facts arising from a given dispute. 
The GSU and HathiTrust cases are the first significant lawsuits to take 
libraries to court as defendants. Each case follows a different path of in-
terpretation within fair use jurisprudence. Whereas the GSU courts follow 
case law that emphasizes the commercial and market effect embodied in 
the fourth factor, the HDL courts follow case law that focuses on the pur-
pose and character of the work to determine a finding of fair use. The 
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availability of digital licenses for the excerpts weighs heavily in GSU, as 
does the amount used in light of the purpose. But using a reasonable, 
helpful, fair use checklist to make decisions, GSU instructors make proper 
determinations about fair use. Through two rounds at the District Court, 
the vast majority of the uses of copyrighted material made by GSU instruc-
tors for pedagogical purposes, and supported by the University Library 
electronic reserves system, are fair use. The HDL courts placed a higher 
significance on whether the use is transformative in its four-factor analysis. 
There, the court reasoned the more transformative the uses, the more 
they counted as fair. While the HDL was declared the prevailing party 
with a successful fair use defense, and the District Court has twice found 
GSU the prevailing party, the GSU lawsuit is still pending in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals as of April 2018.5 These two cases inform and 
contextualize activities that libraries perform on a daily basis to meet their 
educational and research missions within the legal landscape. Coupled 
with the ARL Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research Li-
braries, they should help librarians understand and anticipate how courts 
apply the four-factor test of fair use. 
Notes
1. Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institu-
tions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 67 (1976). Hereinafter 
referred to as Classroom Copying Guidelines.
2. The minority opinion was a concurrence since the judge agreed with the majority that 
the case should be reversed and remanded, but reads like a dissent since it disputes the 
majority’s reasoning in doing so.
3. Since the defendants in the GSU case were sued in their capacity, not individually, the 
GSU case is referred to as both Patton and Becker, the two presidents of GSU during the 
course of this litigation.
4. The HathiTrust court did not consider the preservation purpose to be transformative, but 
still fair under the first factor since it was for a noncommercial use.
5. In October 2018, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court, 
directing the judge to amend her fourth factor analysis.
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